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ABBREVIATIONS
ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean
EKC Environmental Kuznets Curve
FDI Foreign direct investment
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade
IISD International Institute for Sustainable 
Development
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market
NAAEC North American Agreement of En-
vironmental Cooperation (NAFTA’s 
environmental side agreement)
NACEC or CEC Commission for Environmen-
tal Cooperation of the NAAEC
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agree-
ment
NGOs Non-governmental organisations
PPMs Processes and production methods
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development
UNEP United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme
WTO World Trade Organization
INTRODUCTION
Like in most developing countries, La-
tin American governments have been wo-
rried about remaining competitive in world 
trade and attracting foreign investment as 
key aspects of their economic development. 
Nowadays, the region is experiencing a race of 
negotiations of bilateral free trade agreements 
in addition to regional trade agreements con-
solidated during the last decades. However, the 
process of trade and investment liberalisation 
raised important concerns about environ-
mental eff ects. Th ose eff ects can be direct as a 
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consequence of economic activities or indirect 
through the infl uence of trade regimes on en-
vironmental policies and management. Th is 
latter aspect is analyzed in this paper.
An overview of the liberalisation pro-
cesses and their main drivers show how trade 
regimes have been gaining relevance in the 
national economic and political agendas of the 
Latin American governments. By the 1980s, 
economic pressures such as the external debt 
crisis and the following reduction of inter-
national private loans increased the value of 
foreign direct investment, which in turn led 
to competition for foreign capital through li-
beralisation and deregulation of economic ac-
tivities (Ruiz-Caro, 2005, 13). Th ese concerns 
were refl ected in the macroeconomic reforms, 
export oriented development strategies and 
the shrinking of the state in productive acti-
vities that occurred in most Latin American 
countries over the past two decades (Schaper, 
2000, 211). As a part of these strategies, trade 
and investment regimes have been reinforced 
in the region through diff erent international 
accords at the multilateral, regional and bilate-
ral levels at an accelerated pace, especially since 
the 1990s. Th e governments of the region ex-
pected to boost comparative advantages and 
trade gains as well as increase the infl ow of 
foreign capital to off set the lack of domestic ca-
pital and accelerate economic growth. Despite 
these assumptions, the economic reforms and 
market integration attempts have not brought 
the expected benefi ts. In contrast, there is a 
great concern that foreign investment is not 
being channelled according to national and 
long-term development priorities (ECLAC, 
2002 cited in UNCTAD, 2005a, 69).
Since the 1990s, the region experienced 
an expansion of trade regimes on account of 
the creation of the Southern Common Mar-
ket (Mercosur) and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the strengthening 
of the Andean Community, the negotiation of 
various bilateral trade agreements within the 
countries of the region and other continents, 
and the starting of negotiations of a Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) (Levy-Yeyati et 
al., 2003, 5). In July 2000 around 20 trade 
agreements within the Americas1 were in for-
ce, a similar number were under negotiation, 
in addition to other cross regional agreements 
(WTO, 2000, 5-Chart 2). More recently, the 
FTAA negotiations came to a halt (“Uncle 
Sam visits his restive neighbours;…”, 5 Nov. 
2005, 65), however, the United States con-
cluded bilateral trade agreements with Chile, 
the Central American countries and some An-
dean Community countries. On the Southern 
Cone, in July of 2006, Mercosur enlarged its 
jurisdiction with the membership of Venezuela 
(“Downhill from here; Mercosur’s summit”, 
29 July 2006, 47). In terms of investment, 
“FDI [foreign direct investment] has received 
1 Th is refers to regional trade agreements under the following classifi cations: i) free trade areas, which are defi ned 
“as agreements among two or more parties in which reciprocal preferences (whether or not reaching complete free 
trade) are exchanged to cover a large spectrum of the parties’ trade in goods”; and ii) customs unions, which are defi ned 
“as regional trade agreements with a common external tariff  in addition to the exchange of trade preferences” (WTO, 
2000, 2)
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favourable treatment in most Latin American 
countries as part of a broader free-market 
and liberalisation policy put in place in the 
1990s.” (UNCTAD, 2005a, 69). Th e NAFTA 
and the ensuing trade agreements accorded 
by the United States with other countries in 
the region share in common the inclusion of 
investor protection provisions. In addition, 
other bilateral investment agreements have 
been signed by the countries of the region 
to an accumulated number of 451 by 2004 
(UNCTAD, 2005a, 72).
Th is process of trade and investment li-
beralisation raised important concerns about 
environmental eff ects. Schaper suggests that 
trade liberalisation has changed the export 
and productive structure of the region and 
that the emerging structure is environmentally 
more vulnerable (2000, 212). Even though 
important eff orts have been made to streng-
then environmental policies and legislation 
in most Latin American countries during 
the last two decades, the application and en-
forcement of environmental laws remained 
weak and environmental degradation persists 
(Rodríguez-Becerra and Espinoza, 2002, 1; 
Schaper, 2000, 220; Larraín, 2000, 230; Acu-
ña, 1999, 51). Given these conditions it can 
be questioned if there are aspects of current 
trade and investment regimes that aff ect the 
protection of the environment and what the 
present connotations of this relationship in the 
Latin American context are.
Th e hypothesis proposed is the following., 
In order to favour export oriented sectors and 
attract foreign investment, current trade and 
investment regimes in Latin America may: i) 
Infl uence environmental policy to refl ect the 
needs of export sectors or converge to some 
standards of the primary markets; ii) Superim-
pose investment rights and investment pro-
tection measures on to public environmental 
concerns and open the gates to confl icts bet-
ween the application of trade and investment 
norms and national environmental laws; iii) 
Slow down the capacity of governments and 
the willingness of decision makers to approach 
the fundamental environmental problems that 
result from trade and investment activities and 
adopt a ‘minimalist’ approach. Th e net result 
is a reduced space for further development of 
environmental policies in which trade and 
investment considerations turn into the main 
drivers of changes, as it is suggested by Zars-
ky (2002) as the actual worldwide pattern of 
trade-environment relationship. 
Moreover, negative environmental eff ects 
of trade and investment regimes can be ampli-
fi ed by the fact that the export structure in the 
region relies partly on environmentally sensi-
tive industries and those intensive in natural 
resources (Schaper, 2000, 212; Ruiz-Caro, 
2005, 11), and that 15% of foreign investment 
is concentrated in the primary sector (Ruiz-
Caro, 2005, 13). Th en, an increase of these 
activities due to trade or investment fl ows may 
require solid environmental policies. Th ose 
policies should stimulate internalisation of 
environmental costs and mitigate or prevent 
environmental damage by reinvesting revenues 
of environmentally sensitive industries as well 
as those that require intensive use of natural 
resources toward the protection of ecosystems. 
Th is is not the current case and there is no sign 
that there would be political will to exert those 
changes in the short term. 
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Some basic concepts need to be clarifi ed. 
For the purpose of this document, trade refers 
to international trade of goods and services. 
Investment refers to foreign direct investment 
(FDI). FDI exists when there is “… control 
by a resident entity in one economy (foreign 
direct investor or parent enterprise) in an en-
terprise resident in an economy other than 
that of the foreign direct investor (FDI enter-
prise or affi  liate enterprise or foreign affi  liate).” 
Th is type of investment “… implies that the 
investor exerts a signifi cant degree of infl uence 
on the management of the enterprise resident 
in the other economy.” (UNCTAD, 2002). 
Regimes, as described by Krasner, are “… sets 
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, ru-
les, and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a gi-
ven area of international relations.” (1982, 
186). Th e negotiation and practice of trade 
and investment agreements can be considered 
core to the formation of trade and investment 
regimes. Th ose agreements, arranged at the 
international level, are incorporated into 
national legislation and constitute a part of 
the legal and policy framework of trade and 
investment activities within a country. Th ey 
express principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures. Th us, for the purpose of 
this document, those agreements are conside-
red as regimes. 
Th is document focuses on the cases of 
NAFTA and Mercosur because they are the 
most infl uential models of trade and inves-
tment regimes in the region. Th e former has 
been operating since 1994 and its negotiations 
were accompanied by an environmental deba-
te that led to an environmental agreement on 
the side. NAFTA includes a special section de-
dicated to investment provisions and investor 
rights and it has been used by the United Sta-
tes as the main precedent for following trade 
agreements with Central American, Caribbean 
and South American countries. Moreover, it 
can be expected that a future Free Trade Area 
of the Americas may contain similar provisions 
to NAFTA and other agreements already in 
force between countries of the region and the 
United States. Th e latter, Mercosur, is the most 
important example of economic integration 
in the region with a dynamic intraregional 
market and the biggest economic power in 
the Southern Cone, its leading member being 
Brazil. Th e negotiation of Mercosur did not 
involve an environmental debate such as that 
of NAFTA. However, there are many concerns 
about the environmental implications of in-
traregional energy and infrastructure projects 
and the burden of environmentally sensitive 
industries and those intensive in natural re-
sources. In addition, there is a great deal of 
uncertainty about how environmental policies 
will be harmonised within the economic inte-
gration process. 
Th e methodology used consists of: i) a 
review of some of the theoretical approaches 
to the interface between trade and the envi-
ronment that are suggested as more adequate 
for the case of Latin America; ii) a review of 
studies of the environmental concerns that 
surround the negotiations and practice of 
NAFTA and Mercosur; and iii) an analysis 
of the fi ndings of the two cases. It should be 
noted that according to the available literature 
the case of Mercosur is less studied in com-
parison to NAFTA. Th is document relies on 
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secondary sources and does not constitute a 
comprehensive analysis. Its aim is to identify 
the general trends of the relation between tra-
de-investment regimes and the environmental 
management in Latin America.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In examining the possible environmental 
consequences of trade and investment regimes 
in Latin America some analytical considera-
tions must be taken into account. 
Th e diff erentiation between the environ-
mental consequences of trade and investment 
as economic activities, and those related to 
their regimes should be noted. Th is diff erentia-
tion is not always explicit in the debate on free 
trade and environment. Trade and investment 
agreements are incentives to allow the expan-
sion of economic activities but they are not 
the activities as such. It is expected that they 
infl uence how such activities evolve; howe-
ver, there might be a number of other factors 
that stimulate or constrain trade. Economic 
activities in general involve processes such as 
extraction of resources, transformation, pro-
duction, transportation and consumption of 
goods and services with consequent impacts 
to the environment in terms of pollution and 
resource depletion. Th erefore, increases in tra-
de and investment fl ows may necessarily cause 
various physical and economic impacts on the 
environment that can be classifi ed in relation 
to the products being traded, the scale and 
composition of production and other eff ects 
derived from activities such as transportation 
(OECD, 1994 cited in UNEP and IISD, 
2005, 45-50). Th ese physical impacts need 
to be diff erentiated from those caused by the 
application of norms and rules derived from 
international agreements and the interaction 
between trade and environmental laws (UNEP 
and IISD, 2005, 53). Th is last set of impacts 
are the main focus of this analysis.
Th e interaction of international trade 
and investment regimes with environmental 
policies is mediated by an unbalanced reality: 
the predominance and infl uence of economic 
and commercial concerns above other public 
issues. Firstly, the broadening and deepening 
of international trade disciplines should be 
noted. As Mann pointed out, “Th ere is little 
doubt that trade agreements today tell govern-
ments what they can and cannot do, and how 
they can or cannot do things, in a wide range 
of areas.” (2000, 6). International trade agre-
ements are covering other forms of regulation 
(including environmental), that might have 
an impact on trade. In this sense, international 
trade law and associated investment rules, due 
to their ability to set and enforce global rules, 
are conforming to “… a new constitutional 
structure directly applicable to governments 
that are party to the regimes.” (Mann, 2000, 
7). In contrast, there is a lack of this capacity 
of enforcement in international environmen-
tal law, due in part to its inability to sanction 
governments. Nonetheless, agreements under 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), at the 
multilateral level, or NAFTA, at the regional 
level, establish that environmental policies 
should be consistent with trade obligations 
and disciplines. But, “… why is it important 
for environmental management to be con-
sistent with trade law obligations?” (Mann, 
2000, 4)
10Rev Opera 9_DMartinez.indd   177 4/16/10   1:18:35 PM
M E D I O  A M B I E N T E
1 7 8
Secondly, economic policies exert ove-
rarching infl uence over other public realms. 
As Ekins pointed out, “in all countries, envi-
ronmental policy is enacted with reference to 
other policy objectives, of which economic 
policy objectives are among the most im-
portant.” (2003, 165). Th erefore, “the most 
difficult environmental policies are those 
which are perceived to have a negative impact 
on the economy.” (2003, 165). For instance, 
neo-classical trade economics “… tends to 
stress the dangers of environmental policy 
for the trade system rather than the reverse.” 
(Muradian and Martinez-Alier, 2001a, 281). 
Policy measures that promote exports or tra-
de liberalisation and inward foreign direct 
investment tend to capture great attention of 
governments compared to environmental is-
sues. Th is situation can be more acute in many 
developing countries due to factors such as a 
higher dependence on FDI, which “… is now 
the largest source of development fi nance for 
developing countries.” (Gentry, 1999 cited in 
Ekins, 2003, 166). 
Any perspective on the environmental 
policy impacts of trade and investment re-
gimes have to consider the importance of 
competitive pressures as well as the process of 
policy harmonisation involved in trade agree-
ments, in particular regional agreements and 
economic integration processes. Attending to 
these factors, Zarsky (2002) suggested that 
environmental policies are “stuck in the mud”, 
referring to the situation in which, “… in the 
absence of eff ective multilateralism, economic 
globalization inhibits innovation in national 
environmental policy, and thus the rate of 
improvement in environmental performance.” 
(2002, 19). By economic globalisation Zarsky 
refers to the dual and interrelated impacts of 
international economic institutions and mar-
kets. Th e main arguments exposed by Zarsky 
(2002, 24) are as follows: First, “… the cons-
traints of competitiveness induced by globa-
lization retard the capacity and willingness of 
all nation states to take any unilateral measures 
that imposes costs of good environmental ma-
nagement on domestic producers.”; Second, 
“… the pressures of policy convergence mean 
that measures that are taken will only be those 
in step with primary competitors.”; As a con-
sequence, “… markets become the primary 
drivers of changes in environmental perfor-
mance”, and in addition, “… environmental 
managers are pressured to maintain the status 
quo or to change it only incrementally.” Th is 
approach has inspired the current analysis of 
the cases of NAFTA and Mercosur. 
Zarsky’s (2002) “stuck in the mud” pers-
pective seems to be more adequate to analyse 
the eff ects of trade and investment regimes on 
environmental policies compared to, for exam-
ple, “… the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
(EKC) hypothesis, which in crude terms states 
that environmental quality tends to improve 
beyond a certain income threshold” (Ekins, 
2003, 164), or the “pollution havens” hypo-
thesis which argues that developing countries 
will attract “… ‘dirty’ industries because of 
their less stringent environmental standards” 
(Mabey and McNally, 1999 cited in Jenkins, 
2003, 82). On the one hand, generalisation 
of the EKC hypothesis is used to argue the 
positive eff ects of trade on the environment, 
assuming that free trade leads to more affl  uent 
societies that will request stringent environ-
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mental standards. On the other hand, the 
pollution havens hypothesis refl ects the fears 
of a displacement of industries from develo-
ped to developing countries in order to take 
advantage of lower environmental compliance 
costs. However, as a review of Ekins revea-
led “… neither of the positions at the ends 
of the spectrum of hypotheses about trade-
environment relationship can be sustained.” 
(2003, 182). Th ere is even very limited evi-
dence to support EKC and pollution havens 
hypotheses-the policy community refers to 
them as consequences of trade liberalisation 
(Gallagher, 2004, 10).
A study by Gallagher (2004) that analysed 
the process of trade liberalisation in Mexico 
between 1985 and 2000 showed that neither 
the EKC nor the pollution havens hypotheses 
explain the environmental impacts of trade in 
this country. Jenkins (2003), in a study that 
evaluates the pollution havens hypothesis for 
manufactured goods industries in Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico, found two diff erent trends. 
Th is author showed that during trade liberali-
sation in Argentina and Brazil exports remai-
ned more polluting than imports suggesting 
a pollution havens trend that does not occur 
in Mexico (Jenkins, 2003, 91). However, this 
analysis was based on changes of economic 
composition during liberalisation processes, 
but did not consider changes in environmental 
policies. Th erefore, it is not possible to con-
clude that an intensifi cation of more polluting 
industries was due to low environmental stan-
dards and not by other factors. Furthermore, a 
core critique of the pollution havens hypothe-
sis is that the economic costs of environmental 
degradation or environmental compliance 
costs in most industries are relatively smaller 
than many other operating or investment costs 
that determine comparative advantages or lo-
cation decisions. (Gallagher, 2004, 11; Zarsky, 
2002, 24; Batabyal, 1995 cited in Muradian 
and Martinez-Alier, 2001a, 283).
Even though the current analysis focu-
ses on the impacts of trade and investment 
regimes on environmental policy, the consi-
deration of the physical and economic eff ects 
of trade and investment cannot simply be set 
aside. If trade and investment regimes support 
and create incentives to certain economic and 
environmental relations, those have to be 
understood. As Ruiz-Caro pointed out, most 
exports of raw materials and natural resources 
have free or reduced tariff  access to markets of 
industrialised countries, and one of the cor-
nerstone ideas of the FTAA and the trade agre-
ements of the United States is the deregulation 
of energy and natural resources sectors in Latin 
America (2005, 7). Th is shows the importance 
of trade regimes in orienting economic sectors 
and aff ecting the environment. 
In this respect, a comprehensive and 
structural critique to the current trade system 
has been made by Muradian and Martinez-
Alier (2001a; 2001b). Th ese authors stress 
the notion of “environmental cost-shifting” 
or “environmental load displacement eff ects” 
caused by trade and investment fl ows bet-
ween North and South (2001a; 2001b). Th is 
perspective is supported with some evidence 
of Latin America among other developing 
regions. 
If one conceives international fl ows of cheap primary 
products (or environment-intensive products in gene-
10Rev Opera 9_DMartinez.indd   179 4/16/10   1:18:35 PM
M E D I O  A M B I E N T E
1 8 0
ral) as “ecological fl ows”, that is, as environmental-cost 
shifting from the importing to the exporting country, 
then freer trade can promote increasing environmental-
load displacement from the importing to the exporting 
country (2001a, 286) 
Th us, environmental problems can be 
unequally distributed by trade. “At the global 
level, there is a clear fl ow of primary commo-
dities from poor to rich countries. …Clearly, 
the Th ird World is specialised in exploitation 
of natural resources.” (2001a, 286). Th is nega-
tive trend can be exacerbated by other factors, 
such as low commodity prices (2001a, 287) 
and economic adjustment programmes (Guha 
and Martinez-Alier, 1997, 66) that push de-
veloping countries to maintain their revenues 
by selling growing quantities or increasing the 
exploitation of natural resources to diminish 
the burden of macroeconomic policies. Mo-
reover, the world demand of natural resources 
and primary products is expected to increase 
faster due to factors such as the accelerated 
economic growth and urbanisation processes 
of countries like China and India (Ruiz-Caro, 
2005, 16), in this case causing a South to 
South environmental cost shifting.
If Latin American countries specialise 
more in natural resources and environmen-
tally intensive industries, the need for strin-
gent environmental policies and sustainable 
development strategies will become more 
acute. What are the options and constraints 
that trade and investment regimes impose 
on Latin American countries when carrying 
out environmental policies? In the following 
sections, the cases of NAFTA and Mercosur 
will be analysed to track some evidence that 
expresses the relationship between trade-
investment regimes and the performance of 
environmental policies. 
MEXICO AND THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT
Th e establishment of NAFTA in 1994 
between the United States, Canada and Mexi-
co, can be considered for the latter as a further 
step in a process of trade and investment libe-
ralisation already in progress. Mexico started 
to open its economy in the 1980s and “… 
transformed itself from one of the most clo-
sed to one of the most open economies in the 
world.” (Gallagher, 2004, 1). Between the mid 
1980s and the mid 1990s, the average tariff  
was reduced from over 40% to 14%, and at 
the beginning of the 1990s the proportion of 
products covered by non-tariff  barriers was less 
than 4% (Burki and Perry, 1997 cited in Jen-
kins, 2003, 83). Th e composition of Mexican 
exports and foreign investment has profoundly 
changed during the process of liberalisation. 
From the early 1980s to the year 2000, crude 
oil exports transformed its share of total Mexi-
can exports from 80% to less than 10%, while 
manufactures increased its share from around 
15% to close to 85% in the same period (Ga-
llagher, 2004, 1-2). In terms of foreign inves-
tment, “… the regulatory framework became 
less restrictive and in 1989 a new set of rules 
repealed all previous regulations governing 
foreign investment and widened the range of 
operations where 100% foreign ownership 
was permitted.” (Jenkins, 2003, 83-4). Th e 
FDI infl ow has nearly tripled between 1985 
and 1999 (UNCTAD, 2002 cited in Gallag-
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her, 2004, 2). Th e majority of FDI infl ows in 
Mexico, (60%) has been directed to manu-
factures and an equal percentage of total FDI 
came from the United States (2004, 2). 
In this context, the project of NAFTA 
was considered of strategic importance for the 
Mexican government. “… NAFTA was not 
simply about maximizing gains from trade, 
but was also designed to ‘lock in’… economic 
reforms in Mexico. It was designed to convince 
multinationals that Mexico was an attractive 
site for foreign investment.” (Dunnof, 2000, 
258). Economic concerns were at the forefront 
of the Mexican political agenda when NAFTA 
was proposed and environmental concerns 
were seen as obstacles to the liberalisation 
process.
NAFTA’s environmental orientation
Th e environment gained special political 
attention during the negotiation of NAFTA, 
from 1990 to 1994. Confl icting perspectives 
and interests, “… between the trade commu-
nity and other sectors of society seeking social 
and environmental well-being”, were refl ected 
in the environmental debate (Various authors 
cited in Sanchez, 2002, 1373). Within the tra-
de community were those who promoted and 
defended free trade such as business groups 
and transnational corporations, professional 
organisations, trade and economic agencies 
of the public sector of the three countries 
(Sanchez, 2002, 1373). Th e trade commu-
nity stressed an optimistic scenario in which 
NAFTA increased incomes, improved envi-
ronmental protection and widened access to 
cleaner technologies, in particular for Mexico 
(Schatan, 2000, 167). 
Within the environmental community, 
“… the links of environmental groups with 
academic researchers were strong” (Hogen-
boom, 1998, 142). A range of environmental 
NGOs from the three countries, in which 
those in the United States were the more in-
fl uential, were actively raising environmental 
concerns about NAFTA with diff erent levels 
of opposition and political leverage and con-
ducting alliances with other groups such as 
trade unions (1998, 142-155). Environmental 
NGOs in the United States “… feared that 
free trade with Mexico (with its notorious 
lack of environmental enforcement) would 
strengthen US corporate demands for less 
environmental regulation and create more op-
portunities to evade such regulations.” (1998, 
152). Th us, the environmental performance 
and enforcement of the law in Mexico turned 
into the central preoccupations of the debate. 
For instance, the creation of an environmen-
tal agreement, accompanying NAFTA, was a 
response to this controversy (Schatan, 2000, 
168). 
It is noticeable that the discussion of the 
environment gained importance due to the 
political leverage of the environment com-
munity in the United States that turned the 
Mexican environmental problem into a do-
mestic political issue. After a long bargaining 
process, “NAFTA’s drafters had to negotiate 
between including environmental provisions, 
respecting state sovereignty, and limiting stan-
dards and other technical barriers that could 
be used for protectionist ends.” (Sanchez, 
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2002, 1370). As Schatan (2000) showed, in 
different periods of the negotiation, from 
1991 to 1993, the governments of Bush and 
Clinton proposed initiatives to address envi-
ronmental concerns and gain political support 
and congressional approval of the agreement, 
concluding with the establishment of the 
North American Agreement on Environ-
mental Cooperation (NAAEC), also known 
as environment side-agreement (2000, 168-
170). Sanchez (2002) pointed out that, while 
the United States perceived the institutions 
of the NAAEC “… as part of its compromise 
with domestic environmental groups to gain 
congressional approval of NAFTA.” (2002, 
1376), “Mexico and Canada did not face 
the same domestic pressures; for them, the 
NACEC [Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation] is part of the cost of NAFTA.” 
(2002, 1377).
The environmental provisions of the 
agreement (Table 1) and the environment 
side-agreement (Table 2) were the result of 
the environmental debate of NAFTA. Th e 
central environmental aspects of NAFTA are 
the promotion of environmental cooperation 
and the enforcement of the law, an upward 
harmonisation of environmental standards 
and to channel public concerns about the 
performance of environmental policy through 
various means, including a dispute settlement 
process between individuals or organisations 
and governments that fail to enforce the law. 
Nonetheless, all environmental provisions are 
tied to the trade and investment objectives of 
the agreement. According to Hufbauer et al. 
(2000, 7) and Schatan (2000, 171), NAFTA 
is less restrictive for governments in terms of 
establishing own environmental standards and 
enforcing them on imports, in comparison 
with the General Agreement on Tariff s and 
Trade (GATT). Moreover, in case of a confl ict 
with standards, “NAFTA’s provisions place 
the burden of the proof on the complaining 
nation …” instead of GATT, “… where the 
off ended country has to prove that its policy is 
consistent with the free trade provisions.” (Ho-
genboom, 1998, 204). In this respect NAFTA 
seems “greener” than the WTO. 
Th e environmental provisions of NAFTA 
and the environment side agreement seem to 
potentially have a positive eff ect on environ-
mental policies. Nonetheless, there are central 
environmental issues that are not covered by 
NAFTA or its environment side-agreement, 
in addition to contradictions and problems 
revealed during the implementation. Mo-
reover, a strong opposition from the gover-
nmental sector and the trade community to 
the development of these provisions became 
more obvious.
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TABLE 1. MAIN ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS OF NAFTA
Preamble
It provides that the agreement should be implemented ‘in a manner consistent with environmental protection and 
conservation’, the promotion of ‘sustainable development’, and the strengthening of the ‘development and enforce-
ment of environmental laws and regulations’.
Chapter 1: Objectives
Article 102, about the objectives; does not mention the environmental issues brought up in the Preamble.
Article 104 specifi es that obligations under certain international environmental agreements prevail over NAFTA. The list 
of environmental agreements covered by this article can be extended with the consent of all NAFTA members.
Chapter 7: Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Articles 712.1, 712.2 and 713.3 provide to each party the right to establish its own level of ‘protection of human, animal 
or plant life or health in its territory, including a measure more stringent than an international standard’
Article 715 states that parties should take into account considerations of risk assessment and levels of protection such 
as relevant scientifi c evidence, relevant process and production methods, inspection methods and relevant pest and 
diseases treatments, among others. 
Chapter 9: Standards-Related Measures
Article 904.2 provides to each party the right to establish its own level of ‘protection of human, animal or plant life or 
health, the environment or consumers’
Article 907.2 set the limits of the level of protection indicating that it should avoid: a) arbitrary or unjustifi able discrimi-
nation; b) constitute a disguised restriction on trade; c) discriminate between similar goods or services for the same use 
under the same conditions that pose the same level of risk and provide similar benefi ts
Chapter 11: Investment
The chapter provides investment rights and rules for the resolution of investor-state disputes through arbitral panels.
Article 1106.2 makes possible that countries demand that foreign investors comply with certain technological specifi -
cation required by domestic environmental standards.
Article 1114 declares that ‘it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic, health, safety or environ-
mental measures.’
Source: author based on Schatan, 2000, 170-2; “North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of the 
United Mexican States, and the Government of the United States of America” 1994.
TABLE 2. MAIN SECTIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (NAAEC)
Objectives
The objectives (Art. 1) include: a commitment to improve environmental protection through cooperation in environ-
mental and economic policies; The improvement of rules and laws that regulate environmental practices, as well as 
enforcement; An explicit commitment to avoid trade distortions and the creation of new barriers to trade in the form 
of disguised protectionism
Obligations
Article 2 defi nes obligations such as the preparation and publication of reports on the state of the environment, pro-
motion of environmental education, and the promotion of economic instruments to pursue environmental goals.
Article 3 allows each member to establish its own priorities and level of environmental protection.
Article 5 defi nes particular actions to be taken by the parties to enhance and enforce domestic environmental laws.
Article 6 empowers interested persons to request the party’s competent authorities to investigate alleged violations of 
its environmental laws and regulations.
Commission for Environmental Cooperation
Article 8 creates the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, comprised of a Council, Secretariat, and a Joint Public 
Advisory Committee. 
Article 10 defi nes the functions of the Council. Among the most important is to assist NAFTA’s Free Trade Commission in 
preventing and resolving disputes.
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Limitations and problems of NAFTA’s 
environmental approach
Th ere are a number of issues from the 
environment-trade debate that NAFTA and 
its environment side-agreement do not con-
sider or treat ambiguously. In relation to the 
environmental provisions there are various 
concerns. Some of these provisions tend to be 
very weak in practice. For instance, there are 
no mechanisms such as trade sanctions for 
the enforcement of a country’s environmental 
law, while upward harmonisation principles 
of environmental standards, even if included, 
are not mandatory (Hogenboom, 1998, 205). 
Schatan (2000, 178-9) identifi ed various other 
aspects that are not covered by NAFTA: i) 
Th ere is an emphasis on pollution control 
while natural resources and conservation re-
lated issues are not considered. “Hence, the 
dispute settlement regime cannot deal with 
unsustainable natural resource management, 
leaving some of the most pressing environ-
mental problems apparently unattended.” ; 
ii) Th e “polluter pays principle” does not seem 
to be included in the NAAEC. “Th e fi ne that 
may be levied on the party at fault (…) is not 
calculated on the basis of the cost involved in 
the environmental damage.” Moreover, “…
the fi ne is paid not by the polluting industry 
but by the governments, therefore it is not 
the polluting agent who suff ers fi nancially.” ; 
iii) Th e NAAEC avoids dealing directly with 
“processes and production methods” (PPMs), 
or the way in which a product is made, which 
is a defi nitive issue in looking at the environ-
mental footprint of production. 
Other problems arose during the im-
plementation of NAFTA. A detailed analy-
sis by Sanchez (2002) showed the confl icts 
between NAFTA and the Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation, which impeded 
a satisfactory implementation of the latter. 
“Th e creation of NAFTA’s environmental side 
agreement and the NACEC [Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation] led to expecta-
tions that the NACEC would become a key 
interface between the environmental and trade 
Article 13 entitles the Secretariat to prepare reports of any matter related to the cooperative functions of the agree-
ment. Those reports are publicly available unless the Council decides otherwise.
Article 14 entitles the Secretariat to address the submission from any person asserting that a party is failing to effecti-
vely enforce its environmental law. If the submission meets certain criteria, the Secretariat will request a response from 
the party. 
Article 15 entitles the Secretariat to consider if the submission warrants developing a factual record that can be availa-
ble for the public, in the light of the response provided by the party. 
Dispute Settlement Process
Articles 24 and 34. In cases where a party is alleged to have persistently failed to effectively enforce its environmental 
law, the Council can establish an international arbitrary panel to report, provide a remedial action plan, and levy mone-
tary fi nes.
Article 36 establishes that in the event that the fi nes are not paid and the enforcement problem is not corrected, the 
parties (except Canada who avoids this obligation) have the power to impose trade sanctions.
Source: author based on Schatan, 2000, 170-4; Sanchez, 2002, 1371-2; “North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation between the 
Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America” 1993
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communities.” (2002, 1373). However, this 
scenario did not occur, in part because the 
opposition of the trade community to con-
sider and discuss some of the negative conse-
quences of trade on the environment, and the 
lack of political and economic support to the 
NACEC from federal environmental agencies 
(2002, 1373). Although an important duty of 
the NACEC is to assist NAFTA’s Free Trade 
Commission, “… the two commissions have 
not met in 8 years …” (2002, 1374). Th is is 
“… a manifestation of the opposition of the 
trade community to allowing environmental 
issues to aff ect enforcement of free trade.” 
(2002, 1374). A study by Blair (2003), that 
revised the citizen submission process esta-
blished on the NAAEC, illustrated the fi erce 
political opposition of the governments to this 
mechanism of public participation, because of 
the fact that it opens the gate to critics.
Th is reaction underlines a basic design fl aw in the NA-
AEC. Th ere is an inherent confl ict in a process that is 
intended to place governments under public scrutiny in 
potentially embarrassing ways but that is also open to 
control by those same governments (Blair, 2003, 318)
It should be noted that environmen-
tal provisions of NAFTA might not be very 
welcome by the environmental authorities, 
in particular those of Mexico. If they decide 
to raise environmental standards to very high 
levels what does it imply? Mexican fi rms, es-
pecially small and medium fi rms, would have 
a large disadvantage compared to American 
and Canadian ones in order to comply wi-
th the norms and implement technological 
changes. Th erefore the government will face 
opposition. In addition, higher standards may 
imply greater eff orts in terms of enforcement 
of the law that will require extra capacity and 
economic resources. In this hypothetical si-
tuation, a possibility is that environmental 
authorities would prefer to slow down the pa-
ce of new environmental standards or favour 
those which require less enforcement or are 
voluntary. Th is kind of situation can explain 
the “minimalist” approach to the interpreta-
tion of the provisions of the NAAEC by the 
three governments.
The impact of investor rights under Chapter 
11 
Foreign investment was a central issue wi-
thin the political debate surrounding NAFTA. 
On the one hand, “the Mexican government 
recognized the need to attract and maintain 
foreign investors…” (von Moltke and Mann, 
2001, 106); on the other, this was an oppor-
tunity for the United States to include the 
minimal standards required by American fi rms 
and liberalise the investment regime in Mexico 
(Morales, 1999 cited in Sanchez, 2002, 1382; 
von Moltke and Mann, 2001, 106). In this 
respect, the purpose of foreign investment in 
NAFTA negotiations was to provide “… en-
hanced guarantees for Canadian and US inves-
tors concerning the safety of their investment; 
and to help protect those foreign investors 
from capricious action against them or their 
investments.” (Mann, 2000, 25). Th us, Chap-
ter 11 of NAFTA incorporates an ambitious 
set of provisions regarding investment that has 
two components (2001, 106): 
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Section A sets out the obligations, or disciplines, on the 
three NAFTA parties in relation to foreign investors from 
the other two parties. It includes provisions for most fa-
vored and national treatment, it proscribes ‘performance 
requirements’, and has strong protections against direct 
or indirect expropriation. Section B provides, for the fi rst 
time in a multilateral trade or investment agreement, 
a formal dispute resolution system that private sector 
foreign investors from one of the parties can initiate 
against the host government if they believe that one of 
these disciplines has been breached to their detriment, 
known as the investor-state process.
Th e main environmental concern results 
from the fact that the use of investor-state 
disputes of Chapter 11 has speeded up since 
NAFTA started to operate until now, and 
from 13 known cases initiated 8 are related to 
environmental protection or natural resource 
management (von Moltke and Mann, 2001, 
110-1). Using the dispute resolution process, 
foreign investors “… avoid the use of domes-
tic courts to address whatever legal issues are 
at the heart of the dispute, and go directly to 
the international arbitration process.” (2001, 
107). Moreover, this international arbitration 
process “… is largely devoid of the safeguards 
that exists in domestic courts to ensure a pro-
per balance between private rights and the 
public interest.” (2001, 107). Th e central pro-
blems for environmental policy and regulation 
have been identifi ed by various authors and 
organisations that analysed the dispute process 
of NAFTA (Oliver, 2005; von Moltke and 
Mann, 2001; Mann, 2000; IISD and WWF, 
2001). Th e most salient of these problems, as 
identifi ed by Von Moltke and Mann (2001) 
are: the ability of the investor-state dispute 
settlement process to bypass domestic legal 
procedures, the inadequacy of commercial ar-
bitration to deal with public concerns, the lack 
of transparency, impartiality and accountabi-
lity of these types of processes and the giant 
costs of claims for governments. 
Th e use of the dispute resolution system 
of Chapter 11 has been demonstrated to be 
a challenge for environmental policies of all 
NAFTA countries. A study of Oliver (2005) 
that analysed two cases of investor-state dis-
pute of Chapter 11 showed the practical pro-
blems for environmental policy. For example, 
there is a potential source of confl ict between 
NAFTA and precautionary-principle measu-
res of environmental policies. Due to the fact 
that the terms of NAFTA established that 
regulatory action to ban certain substances or 
processes has to be based on credible scientifi c 
evidence, but a national or subnational autho-
rity decides to choose a precautionary appro-
ach to defi ne the policy action, “… this action 
may be reversed by a NAFTA tribunal, or the 
member nation may have to pay reparations 
to corporations for lost revenues as a result 
of the regulatory action.” (2005, 67). Th is 
author observed that multilateral trade agree-
ments “… have the potential for eroding the 
sovereignty of nations, especially in regard to 
environmental and public health regulation.” 
(2005, 67). Th e investor-state process seems to 
have been used as a “strategic off ensive tool” of 
foreign investors that challenge public measu-
res, instead of its intended role as a “defensive 
investor protection mechanism”. (von Moltke 
and Mann, 2001, 108). 
Two major factors can restrain govern-
ments’ adoption of new environmental mea-
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sures in the light of the conditions and actual 
use of NAFTA’s Chapter 11: on the one hand, 
the insecurity and unpredictability of the fact 
that any measure can be challenged by foreign 
investors in an external legal system, and on 
the other, the risk of the costs of investor-state 
claims. According to Von Moltke and Mann 
(2001, 109), “the existing claims under Chap-
ter 11 range in value from $10m-750m US.” 
… if this agreement requires compensation to foreign 
investors for new environmental measures, this would 
signifi cantly increase the costs of undertaking such mea-
sures, risking a freeze in existing laws regardless of how 
warranted new measures may be. Th is is directly contrary 
to the stated goals of NAFTA to operate in a context of 
the promotion of sustainable development, in a manner 
consistent with environmental protection, and to streng-
then the development and enforcement of environmen-
tal laws (von Moltke and Mann, 2001, 109)
In the same vein, Dunoff  argued that 
(2000, 258):
NAFTA will understandably be reluctant to upgrade 
environmental standards if doing so can be deemed a 
compensable expropriation. While NAFTA negotiators 
devoted substantial eff orts to ensure that the Agreement 
would not result in lower environmental standards, 
NAFTA’s investor protection provisions may have inad-
vertently made it more diffi  cult for NAFTA parties to 
increase their levels of environmental protection
MERCOSUR
Th e creation of the Southern Common 
Market (Mercosur) between Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay in 1991 was the result 
of previous attempts to initiate an economic 
integration process, especially between Brazil 
and Argentina (Tussie and Vásquez, 2000, 
187). Th ese two countries have encouraged 
trade and investment liberalisation since the 
1980s. Between the mid 1980s and the mid 
1990s, the average tariff  in Argentina was re-
duced from over 50% to 14% and in Brazil 
from over 80% to 13%; the proportion of 
products covered by non-tariff  barriers by the 
early 1990s was less than 1.5% in Brazil and 
0.2% in Argentina (Burki and Perry, 1997 ci-
ted in Jenkins 2003, 83). From 1989 onwards, 
Argentina abolished restrictions on foreign 
investment in various economic sectors and by 
1994 had totally deregulated FDI (Edwards, 
1995 cited in Jenkins, 2003, 84). Th e aperture 
to foreign investment in Brazil was less rapid 
than in Argentina. Th e Constitution of 1988 
imposed more controls on foreign fi rms, no-
netheless, during the 1990s the Constitution 
was amended to allow further liberalisation 
policies towards foreign investment (Chu-
dnovsky and López, 1997 cited in Jenkins, 
2003, 84). 
According to Tussie and Vásquez (2000, 
187), the end of military regimes that led to 
democratic rule and the impulse towards mar-
ket oriented economies in the region are the 
two pillars of the Common Market. “Mercosur 
could be understood as a means for member 
countries to expand outward towards foreign 
markets and attract foreign direct investment, 
in a context of unilateral and multilateral 
trade liberalization.” (2002, 188). Under the 
Treaty of Asunción of 1991 member countries 
of Mercosur compromised on: i) liberalising 
trade among them; ii) creating a common 
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external tariff; iii) establishing a common 
trade policy in relation to other countries; iv) 
coordinating macroeconomic and sectoral po-
licies; and v) harmonising national legislation. 
“Unlike NAFTA, Mercosur still lacks com-
mitments on free trade in services or, on such 
controversial issues as intellectual property and 
government procurement. Nor do agreements 
allow free movement of labour.” (2000, 189). 
Unlike the European Union, Mercosur does 
not conform to a supranational authority, but 
an intergovernmental association based on the 
consensus of its members (von Moltke and 
Ryan, 2001, 1) At the moment, Mercosur can 
be considered a customs union, but not a com-
mon market, with most intra-regional trade of 
goods liberalised and a common external tariff  
subject to a list of exceptions (Ryan, 2000, 
251). In terms of foreign direct investment, 
two agreements can be regarded as the FDI 
policy of Mercosur: 
Th e Protocol of Colonia de Sacramento of December 
1993 requires national treatment and prohibits the use 
of performance requirements regarding foreign investors 
from the region, and includes provisions for compensa-
tion in case of expropriation. Th e Protocol on Promotion 
of Investment from States Not Members of Mercosur 
allows member countries to pursue their own foreign-
investment policy towards non-member countries, lays 
down some principles for fair treatment, and provides a 
dispute-settlement procedure. (van Dijck, 2002, 10)
Environmental aspects of Mercosur
In contrast to NAFTA, the negotiation of 
Mercosur did not stimulate an environmen-
tal debate. For instance, “… the group’s path 
is mainly drawn by agreements between the 
government and the private sector, with little 
input from other actors in the society.” (Tus-
sie and Vásquez, 2002, 188). Th e region has 
a confl ictive history of management of shared 
ecosystems and natural resources, in particular 
regarding rivers. Th us, a geopolitical view of 
the environment prevails (2002, 191). None-
theless, during the preparatory phase of Mer-
cosur, from 1991 to 1994, “the environment 
was a side-issue, hardly among the hierarchy 
of priorities.” (2002, 190). Th e environment 
emerged as an offi  cial issue in 1994 with the 
formal launching of Mercosur at Ouro Pre-
to, however, there is not a proactive agenda 
in this matter (2002, 190). Th e mention of 
environmental concerns in the preamble of 
the Asunción Treaty can be understood as the 
recognition of a dimension other than trade. 
However, the rest of the treaty lacks provisions 
related with the environment. A number of 
political declarations related to the environ-
ment have been raised by the group (Table 3) 
but no profound changes have occurred.
Th e preparation of a Protocol on the En-
vironment, intended as a complement to the 
Treaty of Asunción raised high expectations in 
scholars and experts (von Moltke and Ryan, 
2001, 3; Tussie and Vásquez, 2000, 197; Ryan, 
2000, 253). Th is legal instrument has the 
power to turn environmental considerations 
into constitutive elements of Mercosur, hence, 
environmental principles and norms will per-
meate all the regime. Instead of the Protocol, 
which has not been agreed, Mercosur mem-
bers signed a Framework Agreement on the 
Environment (2001) that synthesises previous 
declarations and general initiatives.
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TABLE 3. DECLARATIONS ON THE ENVIRONMENT 
IN MERCOSUR
Asunción Treaty (1991)
It set the framework for the preparation of Mercosur. It 
specifi es, in its preamble, that the integration of the na-
tional markets and the resulting creation of a common 
market had to be achieved ‘… by the most effective use 
of the resources available… [and] the preservation of 
the environment …’ 
Nonetheless, none of the articles or annexes of the 
Treaty refers to environmental issues.
Las Leñas Presidential Summit (1992)
In this summit the Specialised Meeting on the Environ-
ment (REMA) was established with the aim to give ad-
vice on environmental matters to the Common Market 
Group (GMC), the executive organ of Mercosur.
Canela Declaration (1992)
A joint statement of Mercosur members presented at 
the Rio Conference on Environment and Development.
Taranco Declaration (1995)
Legal harmonisation of environmental regulation, as 
a goal to be achieved, was included in the agenda of 
Mercosur for the fi rst time. The Declaration stressed the 
need to harmonise production and process methods 
(PPMs) that might have an environmental impact on 
shared ecosystems.
Interest in revising the impact of ISO 14000 standards 
on the competitiveness of Mercosur.
Interest in a common strategy for international nego-
tiations.
REMA was upgraded to become a technical subcom-
mittee (TSC 6)
Framework Agreement on Environment (2001)
Summarises previous initiatives and promotes environ-
mental cooperation
Additional Protocol on Environmental Emergen-
cies Assistance and Coop. (2004)
Interest in managing environmental emergencies such 
as fl oods, oil spills, mercury contamination of rivers, etc. 
Source: author based on Mercosur, 2006; Tussie and Vásquez, 
2000,195-7; Von Moltke and Ryan, 2001, 2-4.
Ryan (2000) argued that the harmoni-
sation of environmental norms has focused 
narrowly, with some exceptions, on techni-
cal provisions (for example those to remove 
specifi c obstacles to trade), however, it is not 
the consequence of any common regional 
strategy directed towards sustainable develo-
pment (2000, 252). While market forces have 
been increasing the environmental problems, 
“forward movement [on environmental orien-
tation and strategy] has generally come as an 
after-eff ect of closer political ties and trade 
liberalization, rather than a conscious institu-
tional eff ort …” (Tussie and Vásquez, 2000, 
197). For instance, the harmonisation of envi-
ronmental norms of production processes has 
not yet occurred (Ryan, 2000, 252); though it 
was announced as an environmental objective 
of the group in 1995.
The prospect of unsustainable integration
In order to accelerate the path of econo-
mic integration, the improvement of transport 
links, infrastructure and energy projects, beca-
me a priority for the governments of Mercosur. 
Th is aspect has turned into a policy priority 
with the support of international institutions 
such as the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB). “According to Enrique Iglesias 
[ex-president of the IADB] … the main cha-
llenge in trying to sustain economic growth 
within MERCOSUR is the promotion of 
investment, primarily in the energy sector 
and then in the transport sector.” (Gudynas, 
2000, 241). Nonetheless, local communities 
and NGOs have been objecting most of these 
projects, such as waterways, railways, highways 
and roads, oil and gas pipelines and shared 
dams, showing important environmental 
concerns (Gudynas, 2000). 
A typical characteristic of the region is the existence of 
Transboundary watersheds of great ecological value that 
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are subject to grave risks from the impact of economic 
growth. … Th e Hidrovía (Waterway) Project is an exce-
llent example of a major engineering project that poses 
a potentially diffi  cult environmental and social dilemma 
in the MERCOSUR (Salinas, 2002, 300)
Th is physical integration requires strong 
environmental policies, environmental impact 
assessments and strategic assessments, in addi-
tion to eff ective control of external capital that 
to a large extent funds energy and infrastructu-
re projects of Mercosur (Gudynas, 2000, 248). 
Moreover, the membership of Venezuela and 
the association of Bolivia and Chile to Mer-
cosur, all these countries with specialisations 
in environmentally sensitive and intensive in 
natural resources economic activities, impose 
a greater challenge on the environmental ma-
nagement of the region. 
Another aspect of concern is the so-called 
“dual production pattern” between intra-re-
gional and domestic production and produc-
tion for other markets (Tussie and Vásquez, 
2000, 198). Th is pattern reveals how markets 
can shape the decisions made regarding envi-
ronmental management, but also the need for 
coherent and enforced environmental policies 
to correct environmental externalities of trade 
and investment.
A case in point is the upgrading eff orts of Argentina’s 
petrochemical and paper industries. Petrochemical fi rms 
are motivated by a concern not to be excluded from fo-
reign markets. Local subsidiaries of foreign petrochemi-
cal fi rms are also transferring their more rigorous home 
standards. In the paper sector, pressure from customers 
in export markets has been an important factor infl uen-
cing regional incorporation of clean technologies and 
sustainable production methods (Tussie and Vásquez, 
2000, 198)
Th e steel industry in Brazil and Argentina has undergone 
a similar process. … Exports soared in the last decade, 
forcing the largest fi rms to build new plants to respond 
to increasing foreign demand. Th ese incorporated more 
modern environmental technology, but outdated pro-
duction lines are still used to supply the less stringent 
environment standards of the local market (2000, 198)
However, the net eff ect of trade and inves-
tment fl ows on the environment has proved to 
be negative. Jenkins (2003) suggested that the 
manufacturing sectors of Argentina and Brazil, 
due to “… the combined eff ect of increased 
levels of trade and changes in composition, 
led to an increase in pollution …” since trade 
liberalisation has been operating (2003, 90). 
Another critical sector has been agriculture, 
in which the increase in trading is leading to 
the intensifi cation of unsustainable practices 
(Tussie and Vásquez, 2000, 199)
Because there has not been environmen-
tal harmonisation from the beginning of the 
process of integration, the diff erences in envi-
ronmental standards between members create 
“artifi cial” trade advantages based on the exter-
nalisation of environmental costs. While mar-
ket forces are already operating and exerting 
an impact on the environment and natural 
resources of the region, the process of establis-
hing an operative environmental strategy and 
the harmonisation of environmental laws and 
policies is following a very slow path. 
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CONCLUSIONS
Th e present analysis reveals some general 
tendencies of trade regimes. Further research 
is necessary to identify deeper aspects between 
trade policies and environmental policies at 
diff erent levels. For instance, to identify more 
conclusive evidence of the trade-environment 
policy interface, a detailed study of the envi-
ronmental policy performance in Latin Ame-
rica needs to be conducted. Nonetheless, this 
brief study of NAFTA and Mercosur, as the 
most important trade and investment regimes 
operating in Latin America seems to corrobo-
rate the proposed hypothesis. 
Firstly, those regimes tend to infl uence 
environmental management to reflect the 
needs of export sectors or converge on some 
standards of the primary markets. During the 
negotiation of NAFTA an important issue in 
the United States was the fear of “pollution 
havens” in Mexico. Because of its political 
and economic power, the US can infl uence 
Mexican policy making to converge on some 
standards, in this case environmental. Th us, 
NAFTA and its environmental side-agreement 
refl ect these concerns in its environmental 
provisions. However, these provisions and 
the institutions of the environment side-agre-
ement are understood as a cost of NAFTA by 
the trade communities of the three countries, 
in particular Mexico. Th us, there is no high 
political commitment of the governments to 
environmental matters and the approach tends 
to be very limited.
Th e regime of Mercosur is encouraging 
a “dual production pattern” led by market 
forces. Some evidence shows that companies 
oriented on external markets tend to converge 
on the standards required by those markets, 
while domestic production and intra-regional 
trade tolerate low environmental standards. 
Th is pattern clearly shows how market forces 
are turning into the main drivers of environ-
mental change. However, the uncontrolled 
forces of the market seem to cause net ne-
gative environmental eff ects in the region. 
Hence, stringent environmental policies are 
required.
Secondly, investment regimes superim-
pose investor rights on to public environ-
mental concerns. Th e case of NAFTA and its 
Chapter 11 clearly shows how the excessive 
enforcement of investor rights can be used 
to weaken public concerns and the further 
development of environmental actions and 
policies. Decision makers face uncertainties 
when producing any new environmental 
measure, in addition to the risk of expensive 
investor-state claims. 
In Mercosur, the emphasis on physical 
integration and projects of infrastructure 
and energy, most of them funded through 
foreign investment, is causing great concerns 
on the environmental community. Those 
mega-projects and the arrangements between 
investors and the states of the region need to 
be carefully observed in order to avoid and 
diminish social and environmental impacts. 
Moreover, the fact that there is no regional 
environmental strategy or policy creates uncer-
tainties about how this issue will be pursued 
by governments. 
Both regimes seem to slow down the 
capacity of Latin American governments and 
the willingness of decision makers to appro-
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ach the problems that result from trade and 
investment activities. Furthermore, during 
the negotiations of both regimes public envi-
ronmental concerns were perceived by gover-
nments as obstacles to trade and investment or 
transaction costs of the agreements. 
NAFTA’s institutional approach seems 
to be friendlier to the environment; however, 
governments show reticence when tackling 
the main environmental problems that result 
from the operation of the regimes. Th e coo-
peration eff ort under the NAAEC to enforce 
the Mexican environmental law will probably 
benefi t the capacity of environmental authori-
ties; however, the environmental pressures at 
both the physical and policy level of NAFTA 
seem to exceed any eff ort. In fact, the Chap-
ter 11 has challenged equally environmental 
authorities of the United States, Canada and 
Mexico. 
Harmonisation of environmental laws is 
occurring on technical issues such as sanitary 
and phitosanitary measures, to remove obsta-
cles to free trade, but important environmental 
concerns are avoided. Th e environmental pro-
visions of NAFTA and the environment side 
agreement seem to potentially have a positive 
eff ect on environmental policies. Nonetheless, 
there are central environmental issues that are 
not covered by NAFTA or its environment 
side-agreement, in addition to contradictions 
and problems revealed during the implemen-
tation. Moreover, a strong opposition from the 
governmental sector and the trade community 
to the development of these provisions has 
become more obvious. Th e case of Mercosur 
is also salient. As an economic integration 
process the governments have the possibi-
lity of designing a common environmental 
policy that fi ts the needs and environmental 
problems of its members. However, the ten-
dency is to let the market operate and reduce 
the policy action on environmental matters. 
For instance, both regimes avoid tackling the 
central issues of processes and production me-
thods, and management of natural resources. 
Environmental principles such as “the polluter 
pays principle” or the “precautionary” appro-
ach seem to be sacrifi ced. 
Th e governments of the region have a 
great responsibility if they sacrifi ce public 
interest and environmental issues to the be-
nefit of market access, foreign investment 
and the interest of trade communities. In the 
current “race” for the negotiation of bilateral 
trade agreements and investment treaties with 
multiple countries the risks for environmental 
policy are higher. 
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